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ITH the corporate scandals that swept the country in 2002, cor-
porate law underwent a quiet transformation, the extent of
which we are only now beginning to appreciate. This transfor-
mation was characterized by a significant and continuing shift of lawmak-
ing prerogative from state legislatures to the federal government and
national stock exchanges, and a judicial activism in limiting the discretion
of corporate officers and directors. At the legislative level, the transfor-
mation marked the end, or at least the beginning of the end, of state
supremacy in corporate governance regulation, and the re-imposition of
substantive regulation on corporate actors whose conduct nominally af-
fects only the corporate stakeholders.
At the stock exchanges, the transformation might be characterized as
the acceleration of an evolution, in the sense that in recent years stock
exchanges have been increasingly active in regulating corporate govern-
ance of companies listed with them.1 But the number and scope of recent
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1. Since 1926, the New York Stock Exchange (the "Exchange") has refused to list
nonvoting common stock and will delist the voting common stock of a company that cre-
ates a class of nonvoting common stock, subject to certain limitations. Since 1956, the
Exchange has required listed companies to have at least two outside directors on their
boards. Prior to the changes wrought by the most recent round of corporate scandals (see
Part III B. below), the Exchange Listed Company Manual (the "Manual") also included,
among others, the following corporate governance standards, most of which have been
added or modified in recent years:
302.00 Requirement for an annual meeting of shareholders;
303.00 Requirement for a "qualified" audit committee (including standards on a formal
charter, the composition/expertise requirement of committee members and the indepen-
dence requirement;
304.00 Limitations on classified boards;
312.03 Requirement of shareholder approval for certain stock option or stock purchase
plans and certain related party transactions involving the issuance of common stock; and
313.00 Voting rights of common stock
In addition, the Manual includes informal advice on corporate governance issues such as
concentrated voting (305.00), related party transactions (307.00), defensive tactics in take-
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rules suggest far more than an evolution. At the judicial level, it is clear
that courts-particularly Delaware courts, but not exclusively Delaware
courts-have been influenced by recent corporate scandals and have be-
come more activist in considering challenges to the conduct of corporate
actors. These changes, covering a broad range of initiatives, do share one
common concept: an increased emphasis on the importance, indeed cen-
trality, of independent directors to the corporate governance scheme.
This article explores the changes wrought by what I have called the
"quiet transformation" in corporate law. On the legislative, or rulemak-
ing front, I consider the sensibility of shifting away from state law. On
the judicial front, I consider the significance of a few prominent cases-
two from Delaware and one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit construing Illinois law-and what implication these cases
hold for the development of corporate governance. Finally, I consider
the increased emphasis on the independent directors and the venerable
business judgment rule that protects the conduct of such directors from
judicial scrutiny. I start, however, with a bit of background to place this
transformation in an historical context.
II. THE TRADITIONAL SUPREMACY OF STATE LAW
One of the cornerstones of U.S. corporate law is that the state law of a
corporation's state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the
corporation,2 including, among other things, the relationship between the
directors and shareholders. 3 In contrast to a corporation's internal af-
fairs, the relationship between the corporation and the capital markets,
though a subject of state law, is heavily regulated by federal law4 and, for
companies listed on stock exchanges, by those exchanges as well.5
The scandals at the turn of the millennium were not, of course, the first
time that corporate mischief made the news. Indeed, from time to time
over contests (308.00), transactions in company stock by officers and directors (309.00),
quorum for meetings of common and preferred shareholders (310.00), and shareholder
democracy (312.00). NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL (2003),
available at http://www.nyse.com.
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302-309 (1971). In connection with Congress's adoption of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, the House Conference Report noted the deletion of section
13(d) as unnecessary because it made explicit that the SEC could not "interfere with the
management of the affairs of an issuer." See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 73-1838, at 35
(1934).
3. State corporate law delineates the rights of shareholders, the obligations of direc-
tors, and the rules governing fundamental corporate changes (amendment to articles of
incorporation, mergers, dissolution, and sale of substantially all of the corporation's as-
sets), among other things. Some commentators have characterized the corporation as a
nexis of contracts among the various parties who have an interest in the corporation, such
as shareholders, directors, officers, creditors and employees. See, e.g., Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416-26 (1989).
4. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1988).




scholars have expressed frustration with the lack of governmental over-
sight of large corporations and, as a solution, proposed federal incorpora-
tion or, at least, federal "minimum standards. '' 6 Serious proposals for
federal chartering have been before Congress on several occasions.7 In
the early part of the twentieth century, Presidents Roosevelt, Taft and
Wilson each proposed that corporations be federally chartered.8 The
idea emerged again in the 1930s, as regulators sought a response to the
failures that led to the Great Depression. Federal incorporation was con-
sidered in the New Deal, and though seriously considered, was ultimately
rejected.9 The final serious attempt occurred in the 1970s, following the
publication of an influential law review article by a former chairman of
the SEC.10 Congress again declined to adopt federal minimum standards
for corporations."
Congress's reluctance to federalize corporate law had its analog in the
courts. In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,12 for instance, the U.S. Su-
preme Court halted the federalization of the law of fiduciary duty that
was then developing in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.13 Santa Fe
presented a case in which the minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber
Corp. used Rule 10b-5 to challenge a freeze-out merger engineered by
Kirby's 95% stockholder, Santa Fe. The plaintiffs complained that Santa
Fe breached its fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by failing to
pay a fair price for their shares. Reversing the appellate court, the Su-
preme Court limited the reach of Rule 10b-5 to manipulations and decep-
tions, holding that breaches of fiduciary duty not involving a
6. E.g., RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT COR-
PORATION 70-71 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1976); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 (1974), discussed infra at notes
135-142; Linda C. Quinn, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89
(1972) (illustrating the skepticism predating the Cary article).
7. See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 602-
04 (2003).
8. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURmES REGULATION 152 (3d ed. 1989).
9. See Roe, supra note 7, at 602-03. The view of the New Deal was summarized by
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 42:
Roosevelt committed himself to the long-held populist and progressive goal
of superseding lax state corporation laws with more stringent federal stan-
dards. His securities [law] policy was an attempt to remedy the weaknesses
in the ... state and private rules then in effect, which cumulatively failed to
minimize fraud or unfairness in the initial sale of corporate securities.
Most fundamental of the rules Roosevelt sought to supersede were the state corporation
laws.... Originally the state corporate statutes had been restrictive, limiting, among other
things, the amount of capital a firm could raise. But. . .[b]y the turn of the twentieth
century, "charter-mongering" states like New Jersey, Delaware, and Nevada had stimu-
lated a "race to the bottom" [making their statutes more and more lax].
10. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974), discussed infra at notes 135-142.
11. Roe, supra note 7, at 603-04.
12. 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977).
13. E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); Shoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in
Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1033-46 (1973).
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manipulation or deception are matters of state law, not federal law.14
Similarly, the courts have not allowed the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), through rulemaking, to encroach on internal cor-
porate governance. In response to the use of dual classes of stock as an
anti-takeover tactic in the 1980s, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4, which pro-
hibited the stock exchanges and NASDAQ from listing securities of any
company that "issues any class of security, or takes other corporate ac-
tion, with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the
per share voting rights of holders of an outstanding class or classes of
common stock." 15 Enforcement of this rule was enjoined by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals in The Business Roundtable v. SEC,16 with the
court holding that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority because
the rule regulated corporate governance.1 7 The court was emphatic in
limiting the SEC's authority: "[State law] regulates the distribution of
powers among the various players in the process of corporate govern-
ance, and the Commission's present leap beyond disclosure is just that
sort of regulation. '18
At the same time that corporate takeovers were hot news, lavish execu-
tive compensation was also making headlines. 19 Heeding the lessons
from the Second Circuit, the SEC was more circumspect when respond-
ing to this crisis of corporate governance. The Commission promulgated
a set of rules that dramatically increased the amount of disclosure regard-
ing executive compensation in an issuer's annual proxy statement, 20 but
sought no change in corporate governance. Interestingly, Congress
adopted a mild intervention, amending the tax code to limit the deduct-
ibility of executive compensation in excess of $1 million unless the com-
pensation was performance based.21 Neither disclosure nor tax code
provisions addressed what was widely perceived to be the cause of the
problem: the absence of independent decisionmakers on the question of
executive compensation. 22 Whether or not that was actually the cause of
14. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478-80.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1988).
16. 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 417. The SEC's rulemaking authority was based
on its authority to regulate proxy voting. (Note that following the SEC's failed attempt,
the exchanges "voluntarily adopted similar listing requirements." See Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 28,517, 47 S.E.C. Dock. 377 (Oct. 5, 1990) (approving NASD rule)).
18. Id. at 412.
19. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201 (1996).
20. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 228, 229, 240, 249).
Among other things, the new rules mandated that issuers include in the proxy statement a
table covering a three-year period of the compensation of the CEO and other highly-paid
executives; a table detailing option grants, holdings, and exercises, including values of the
options granted; a chart comparing the company's performance to a peer group; and a
narrative report of the company's compensation committee. See generally Loewenstein,
supra note 19, at 215-17.
21. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,211, 107
Stat. 312, 449 (1993) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code).
22. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Executive Compensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. REV. 937, 945-49 (arguing that directors are beholden to the CEO and therefore
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the pay problem, the measures adopted by the SEC and Congress in the
early 1990s have not resulted in a decline in executive compensation.
Looking at this brief history as a whole, it seems that the federal gov-
ernment and the states reached an unwritten compromise on corporate
law. The federal government would regulate the external aspects of cor-
porate behavior-the interaction between the corporation and the capital
markets-through a disclosure regime.23 On the other hand, the states
would regulate the internal affairs-the relationship between managers
and shareholders. 24 This compromise was tested several times in the
twentieth century, but, with some notable exceptions, seemed to be intact
at century's end.25 Enron changed that, as the next section describes.
cannot negotiate with the CEO). See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of
Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (2000) (reviewing the literature on
whether executives are "overpaid" and why that might be the case).
23. Another example is in the going-private area. Though clearly dissatisfied with
state law that permitted a public company to squeeze out public shareholders on unfavora-
ble terms, the SEC limited its rule to disclosure. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2003), See Going
Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No.
14,185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,091 (Nov. 13, 1977) (proposing Rule 13e-3).
24. This may be a bit of an overstatement, as disclosure rules can affect internal gov-
ernance. Requiring disclosure, for instance, of management's background can discourage
the hiring of certain individuals. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's
Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 459
(2001) (commenting on the relationship between substantive breach of fiduciary duty and
disclosure requirements). An SEC rule that predates the Business Roundtable decision,
the all-holders rule, is put into doubt by that decision. SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-4; SEC Rule 14d-10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2003). This rule requires a tender
offeror to extend the offer to all the target's shareholders, thus precluding the sort of dis-
criminatory tender offer in the landmark case of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 956-57 (Del. 1985). Arguably, this rule goes beyond disclosure to substantive regula-
tion, a matter within the states' prerogative.
25. The SEC has the authority to regulate proxy solicitation, which obviously does
affect internal governance. As Professor Roe has stated:
The wide SEC regulation of proxies determines what goes into the proxy
request to shareholders, what gets onto the ballot, who gets access to share-
holder lists, and how a proxy fight (what could be more basic and internal?)
is waged. This is not a small point. Voting is probably the single most impor-
tant internal corporate affair.
Roe, supra note 7, at 611. However, the extent to which the SEC's proxy rules exceed its
rulemaking authority, because they shade over from disclosure to substantive regulation,
remains somewhat of an open question. See note 147, infra, discussing the SEC's proxy
rules.
Another regulation of internal affairs is the so-called "all holders rule." SEC Rule 13e-4,
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (2003) and SEC Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2003). This
rule was adopted in reaction to the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 958-59 (Del. 1985), where the Delaware Court upheld a defensive self-tender by Unocal
(the target) that excluded Mesa, the hostile bidder. In adopting the all-holders rule, the
SEC effectively overruled state law to the contrary. See Roe, supra note 7, at 619. Again,
the validity of this rule has not been tested before the U.S. Supreme Court.
2004]
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III. SARBANES-OXLEY, THE STOCK EXCHANGES
AND THE SEC.
A. SARBANES-OXLEY
In passing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,26 Congress adopted a
wide-ranging approach to the perceived causes of the financial crises typi-
fied by Enron and WorldCom. To the extent that these crises reflected a
weakness in the regulation of the accounting profession, for instance,
Sarbanes-Oxley created an accounting oversight board.27 Similarly, per-
ceived weaknesses in the independence of the company's auditors were
addressed with new rules to limit non-audit services, to require audit
partner rotation, etc. 28 The law also addressed corporate governance di-
rectly in what might be characterized as two separate sets of initiatives.
The first set consists of changes in aspects of corporate governance that
were already "federalized." Examples include a new requirement that
the company's chief executive officer and chief financial officer certify the
company's periodic filings with the SEC.29 This requirement does alter
the rules of corporate governance, as the functions and responsibilities of
corporate officers are typically matters of state law. However, the federal
securities laws have always specified who signs documents to be filed with
the SEC,30 so requiring officer certification to periodic reports did not
reflect a significant change in the federal-state relationship. 31
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 118, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The Act actually consists
of four laws: The Public Company Accounting Reform and Issuer Protection Act of 2002,
the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, the White-Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, and the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 101, 116 Stat. at 750-53.
28. Id. §§ 201, 116 Stat. at 771-75.
29. Id. §§ 302, 116 Stat. at 777-78.
30. See, e.g., § 6 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f, provides that registra-
tion statements filed under the Act "shall be signed by each issuer, its principal executive
officer or officers, its principal financial officer, its comptroller or principal accounting of-
ficer, and the majority of its board of directors .. " Form 10-K, the annual report required
to be filed by companies registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, must be
signed by a majority of the board of directors, in addition to the principal executive officer,
principal financial officer and controller. See Instruction D to Form 10-K, S.E.C. Fed.
Corp. § 29:7.
31. Other examples include:
§ 305, which empowers the SEC to bar persons from serving as officers or
directors of a public company if they committed violations of the federal
securities laws and are unfit to serve as an officer or director. Under prior
law, a federal court had that authority;
§ 303, which makes it unlawful for an officer or director to interfere with an
audit. While prior law had no analog, neither did state law. Moreover, the
requirement of audited financial statements is, for the most part, limited to
public companies and relates to the capital markets; and
§ 306, which limits the ability of directors and executive officers to trade in
their company's stock during so-called "blackout" periods, i.e., times when
participants in a retirement plan are prohibited from selling company stock.
Federal law has governed retirement plans for many years and this provision
is consistent with that regulation.
[Vol. 57
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The second set of initiatives, of greater importance here, are forays into
what had been the province of the states. These include forfeiture of cer-
tain bonuses and profits, 32 and a bar on loans to officers and directors.33
Each of these provisions addressed abuses at Enron and other companies,
where officers realized substantial bonuses on the basis of fraudulent fi-
nancial statements and benefited from large loans from the company. 34
The forfeiture provision is triggered by an accounting restatement due
to misconduct and requires the chief executive officer and chief financial
officer to reimburse the company for any incentive-based compensation
during the twelve-month period following the filing of the original state-
ment and any profits realized in the sale of company securities during
that period. Such a forfeiture has no analog in prior federal law,35 but
32. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 304, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243. This section provides, in per-
tinent part:
If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the ma-
terial noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any finan-
cial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive
officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for-(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation re-
ceived by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following
the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first oc-
curs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting require-
ment; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-
month period.
33. Id. § 402, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k). This section provides, in pertinent part:
(k) Prohibition on personal loans to executives
(1) In general
It shall be unlawful for any issuer..., directly or indirectly, including through
any subsidiary, to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of
credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or
for any director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer. An
extension of credit maintained by the issuer on the date of enactment of this
subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection, provided
that there is no material modification to any term of any such extension of
credit or any renewal of any such extension of credit on or after that date of
enactment.
(2) Limitation
[sets forth certain exemptions from the probation of (1) for loans such as
home improvement and manufactured home loans, consumer credit, and cer-
tain extensions of credit by registered brokers or dealers that are]
(A) made or provided in the ordinary course of the consumer credit business
of such issuer;
(B) of a type that is generally made available by such issuer to the public; and
(C) made by such issuer on market terms, or terms that are no more
favorable than those offered by the issuer to the general public for such ex-
tensions of credit.
34. One might identify a third initiative, increased federal regulation of the corpora-
tion's "gatekeepers." For instance, under Sarbanes-Oxley, lawyers have to report wrong-
doing up the corporate hierarchy, including, ultimately, the corporation's board of
directors. Sabanes-Oxley, § 307. See, Roe, supra note 7, at 622-23 (discussing the federali-
zation of laws relating to gatekeepers).
35. But note that the SEC has the authority under § 20(d) of the Securities Act of 1933
and § 21(d)(3) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to obtain disgorgement orders against
those who violate the provisions or regulations under those laws. See JAMES D. Cox,
ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURIrIES REGULATION at 872 (3d
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does in state law. If a person receives compensation on the basis of
fraudulent financial statements, the payer may well have a claim under
state law for restitution based on mistake, unjust enrichment, or fraud. 36
Similarly, if an officer realizes a profit on a stock transaction made possi-
ble by fraudulent financial statements, the company may have a claim
against the officer for breach of fiduciary duty and may recover the ill-
gotten gains as damages. 37
While Sarbanes-Oxley does not expressly preclude these state causes of
action, 38 the law may arrest the development of such claims in the same
way that Rule 10b-5 ended the development of state law claims based on
insider trading.39 Of equal importance, Sarbanes-Oxley, by limiting the
recovery to gains of the chief executive officer and chief financial officer,
ed. Aspen Publishers, 2001). To the extent that a disgorgement remedy is otherwise availa-
ble, the forfeiture remedy does not significantly change existing law.
36. See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 19896, 2003 WL 22769045 at
*7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2003), where the court recognized an action to rescind a loan repay-
ment made by the company's CEO using shares of stock that were overvalued as a result of
fraudulent financial statements. The court held that the repayment may be rescinded on
the basis of either unjust enrichment or negligent misrepresentation. The court identified
the elements of unjust enrichment, quoting from an earlier Delaware Supreme Court opin-
ion, as:
the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or
equity and good conscience. To obtain restitution, the plaintiffs were re-
quired to show that the defendants were unjustly enriched, that the defend-
ants secured a benefit, and that it would be unconscionable to allow them to
retain that benefit. Restitution is permitted even when the defendant retain-
ing the benefit is not a wrongdoer. Restitution serves to deprive the defen-
dant of benefits that in equity and good conscience he ought not to keep,
even though he may have received those benefits honestly in the first instance,
and even though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstrable losses.
(Taken by the court from the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Schock v.
Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232-33 (Del. 1999), with internal quotation marks and
footnotes omitted, and emphasis added by the Chancery Court)).
Id. at *7.
The court also identified the elements of negligent or innocent misrepresentation:
To make out their claim of innocent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs must
show: 1) a false statement by [defendant CEO] Scrushy; 2) made with the
intent to induce HealthSouth to act; 3) upon which HealthSouth justifiably
relied in acting; and 4) injury. Equity "provide[s] a remedy for negligent or
innocent misrepresentations: the defendant did not have to know or believe
that his statement was false or to have proceeded in reckless disregard of the
truth." (Quoting from Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074
(Del. 1983) (footnote omitted)).
Id. at *8.
37. See, e.g., Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., No. 90-2927(B), 1995 WL
476772 (Mass. Super. Aug. 2, 1995) (finding the appropriate remedy for breaches of fiduci-
ary duty by directors which result in a profit to those directors to be disgorgement of the
profits). If an officer is responsible for false financial statements, and bonuses paid on the
basis of such statements, the officer would be guilty of constructive fraud, even in the
absence of scienter. See In re RSL Coin Primecall, Inc. v. Beckoff, No. 01-11457, 2003 WL
22989669, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003) (defining constructive fraud).
38. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley does not provide for a private cause of action.
39. For a general discussion of the state common law of insider trading and noting its
"arrested development," see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRAD-
ING, §§ 16.1-16.2 (Little Brown 1996 & Supp. 2002).
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will make it more difficult for state common law remedies to reach other
corporate actors, including directors and members of the audit commit-
tee, who might bear responsibility for the inaccurate financial statement.
Similarly, the prohibition on loans to any director or executive officer
treads on ground previously plowed by state corporate codes.40 Earlier
versions of the Model Business Corporation Act contained limitations on
loans to officers and directors, sometimes requiring disclosure to the
shareholders. Moreover, this outright prohibition deals with a fundamen-
tal prerogative of a board of directors, to decide upon compensation of
officers, and a fundamental aspect of state corporate codes, the authority
of a board of directors. Ironically, the justification for the federal provi-
sion is that loans can constitute a form of "hidden" compensation and,
therefore, should be banned.41 The irony rests in the fact that Congress
could have simply required disclosure (or directed the SEC to do so) and
would have been acting within traditional federal jurisdiction.42 Another
irony is that state corporate codes had required disclosure, so that now
both the states and the federal government have abandoned disclosure
requirements in favor of a federal substantive regulation of internal cor-
porate governance.
The federal ban on loans to officers and directors represents the first
direct federal intervention into executive compensation, and an awkward
one at that. In response to political pressure to address the growing dis-
parity between executive compensation and the compensation of ordi-
nary workers,4 3 Congress amended the tax code to limit the deductibility
of some forms of executive compensation 44 and the SEC has increased
the amount of required disclosure,45 but Sarbanes-Oxley represents an
attempt to limit (or, in this case prohibit) a form of compensation.
Whether loans were the most abused form of compensation, and thus a
logical place for Congress to start, is questionable. Whether Congress
will become further embroiled in the issue is certainly a fair question in
light of Sarbanes-Oxley. In any case, this legislation will likely stifle any
attempt by the states to address the issue of executive compensation.
40. Delaware's code allows a loan to an officer "whenever in the judgment of the
directors such loan . . . may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2002). Presumably, Sarbanes-Oxley will preempt this provision of
Delaware law.
41. See Cong. Rec., S6762 (2002) (Statement of Sen. Feinstein).
42. Indeed, the original Senate Bill (S. 2673) did not include a forfeiture provision, but
did require disclosure (§ 402). See Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the United States Senate to accompany S. 2673 (July 8, 2002).
43. CEOs of America's largest companies earn more than 400 times the compensation
of the average worker in their labor forces. See Loewenstein, supra note 22, at note 9.
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,211, 107
Stat. 312, 449 (1993) adding § 162(m) to the Internal Revenue Code. In addition, the Code
includes limitations on the deductibility of "golden parachute" compensation. See Edward
A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, golden parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: a tax policy
critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 131, 141-44 (1990).
45. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
2004]
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Perhaps the implicit preemption by Congress is a good thing. After all,
the states have done little to address these problems, and indeed seemed
to be moving in the opposite direction. The original 1946 version of the
Model Business Corporation Act prohibited loans to officers and direc-
tors, a provision deleted in § 47 of the 1969 version.46 While state com-
mon law may provide a remedy for recovery of "fraudulent" bonuses, the
remedy would be difficult to realize. A claim would have to be a deriva-
tive claim (assuming the board did not seek to recover the money on its
own), and derivative actions are fraught with difficulties. Demand must
be made on the board of directors, and if it is independent of the officer
or officers who received the bonuses, it is unlikely that the plaintiff will
be able to maintain the action.
Indeed, the leading Delaware case on the demand requirement, Aron-
son v. Lewis,47 illustrates the resistance of the Delaware Supreme Court
to shareholder challenges to executive compensation. In Aronson, the
plaintiff complained of an employment agreement entered into with the
company's then 75-year-old chief executive officer (Leo Fink), who also
owned 47% of the company's outstanding stock. Among other provi-
sions, the agreement provided that upon Fink's retirement, he was to be-
come a paid consultant to the company for the rest of his life, and
payments under that agreement were not to be affected by his inability to
perform services for the company. 48 The Vice Chancellor denied defend-
ants' motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand on the board, ruling
that there was a reasonable inference under the complaint that the busi-
ness judgment rule did not apply to the directors' approval of the transac-
tion.49 The Vice Chancellor opined that as the consulting compensation
was unaffected by Fink's ability to perform services, the transaction may
have been wasteful on its face. 50 Therefore, he concluded, demand was
excused as futile because the director-defendants were potentially liable
for waste and lacked the necessary impartiality to consider the demand. 51
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that demand is re-
quired unless the complaint alleges particularized facts that create a rea-
sonable doubt that "(1) the directors are disinterested and independent
and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment." 52 The Supreme Court found that the
plaintiff's complaint failed under both tests, despite the obvious control
that Fink had over the selection of directors. As to the Vice Chancellor's
conclusion that the contract was potentially a waste of corporate assets,
the Supreme Court's decision is most telling. The Court recited the facts
46. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business
Now a Bank? 1988 Wis. L. REV. 237, 245 (1988).
47. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
48. Id. at 808-09.
49. Lewis v. Aronson, 466 A.2d 375, 384 (Del. Ch. 1983).
50. Id. at 383.
51. Id.
52. Aronson, supra note 47, at 814.
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of a case on which the Vice Chancellor had relied,53 and then summarily
concluded: "Contrasting the facts of Findanque with the complaint here,
it is apparent that plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to render de-
mand futile on a charge of corporate waste .... ,,54 While the facts of
Findanque may have presented a somewhat stronger case for waste, in
part because the agreement did not specify what consulting duties were
required, the lack of analysis in the Supreme Court's decision is at least
disquieting. The agreement in Aronson has all of the hallmarks of an
abusive contract entered into by a dominated board, yet the case was
dismissed because of the strong presumptions in favor of the disinterest-
edness and good faith of the director-defendants.
In short, Congress has become involved in corporate governance be-
cause the states have not, marking an important point in the development
of corporate law. In Part V, I discuss whether the states have been reluc-
tant to act because of competition among them to attract incorporation
business. Regardless of motivation, however, the role of the states in reg-
ulating the substantive behavior of corporate management has been ir-
revocably altered by Sarbanes-Oxley. Combined with the actions of the
stock exchanges and the SEC, discussed in the following sections, state
law is nearly irrelevant in affecting the corporate governance of publicly-
held corporations, with one important exception. That exception is the
continuing relevance of state law in the area of takeover defenses, the
effect of which is to protect management of poorly run firms that, per-
haps, should be taken over.55
B. THE STOCK EXCHANGES
The New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. have
long included corporate governance standards among their listing re-
quirements. 56 The most recent requirements were approved by the SEC
on November 4, 2003,57 and are the most detailed and far-reaching corpo-
rate governance standards ever adopted by the exchanges.5 8 Though simi-
lar, the standards of the two exchanges do differ on some details. It is
sufficient for present purposes, however, to consider just the standards
promulgated by the NYSE.
The key provisions in the new standards relate to the concept of inde-
pendent directors. Boards of all listed companies must have a majority of
independent directors; independent directors must meet at least once
each year in an executive session; and the company must have a nominat-
ing committee, an audit committee and a compensation committee con-
53. Findanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 313-14 (Del.Ch. 1952).
54. Aronson, supra note 47, at 817-18.
55. See infra, text accompanying notes 150-155.
56. See, e.g., supra note 1.
57. The SEC action is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm.
58. The text of the final NYSE listing standards is available at http://www.nyse.coml




sisting solely of independent directors. The standards specify at some
length what satisfies the definition of independence. For instance, the
director is not independent of the listed company if the director has been
an employee of the listed company in any of the most recent three years59
or the director has received more than $100,000 in direct compensation
from the listed company, other than director fees, in any of the most re-
cent three years.60 In addition, the director is not independent if the di-
rector or a member of his or her immediate family was an executive
officer 61 of another company and payments made to or from that com-
pany accounted for $1 million or two percent of that company's consoli-
dated gross revenues.62
These provisions, only some of which are summarized above, are strik-
ing in their philosophy and execution. The stock exchanges have adopted
the view that the future of their listed companies is best assured by inde-
pendent directors, and the exchanges themselves are best situated to de-
fine independence. Neither proposition is self-evident. In Part V, I
consider the wisdom of the underlying philosophy that independent di-
rectors are the sine qua non for effective corporate governance. As to the
definitions that the exchanges have adopted, I would observe that they
are, as inevitably they must be, reliant on objective criteria. Yet, in real
life, other, non-quantifiable criteria may affect one's independence.63
The recent case of In re Oracle,64 discussed further in Part IV, presents a
fine example of this. There, the independence of the directors serving on
a special litigation committee was challenged. The court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the members of the special litigation committee were not
independent of the management directors who were named as defendants
in the shareholders' derivative action. 65 The special litigation committee
would have been independent under the stock exchange rules, but other
factors suggested otherwise. One possible effect of the stock exchange
rules may be to inhibit the kind of careful judicial inquiry undertaken in
Oracle, as courts or other decisionmakers rely on the more objective cri-
teria announced by the exchanges. In any event, the actions of the stock
exchanges demonstrate how the notion of independent directors may be
slipping away from state control.
59. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A2(b)(i) (2003).
60. Id. § 303A2(b)(ii). If a member of the director's immediate family receives such
compensation, the director is deemed not to be independent.
61. Or in the case of the director, an employee.
62. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A2(b)(v) (2003).
63. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 611-12 (1982) (identifying various social and psychological
constraints that limit the ability of a director to act independently).
64. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942 (Del. Ch. 2003).





In October, 2003, prompted by a report and recommendation from its
staff, 66 the SEC proposed a rule allowing shareholder access to a com-
pany's proxy statement for the purpose of nominating directors. 67 Under
the SEC's proposal, if certain triggering events occur, including an elec-
tion for directors in which thirty-five percent or more of the shareholders
indicated that they were withholding their votes, or a proposal allowing
shareholder access to the proxy statement to nominate directors received
more than fifty percent of the votes cast,68 shareholders will have access
to the proxy statement for a period of two years. Shareholders who own
at least five percent of the company's stock for at least two years may
nominate one director for boards with fewer than nine members, two di-
rectors for boards of nine to nineteen members, and three directors for
boards of more than nineteen members.
While there are other limitations on the ability of shareholders to nom-
inate directors under the Commission's proposal,69 the proposal is ex-
66. Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Elec-
tion of Directors (July 15, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm.
67. Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Rel. Nos. 34-48626, IC-
26206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 14, 2003).
68. The SEC also sought comment on a possible third trigger, that the company failed
to implement a proposal approved by the shareholders. Id. at 60,791.
69. For instance, the proposed rule is limited to companies that meet these
requirements:
The company's common equity public float was $75 million or more as of the
last business day of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter;
The company has been subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for a period of at least 12 calendar months;
The company has previously filed at least one annual report pursuant to Sec-
tion 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
The company is not eligible to use Exchange Act Forms 10-QSB and 10-
KSB.
To be eligible to submit a nomination in accordance with proposed Exchange Act Rule
14a-11, a security holder or group of security holders would be required to:
Beneficially own, either individually or in the aggregate, more than 5% of
the company's securities that are eligible to vote for the election of directors
at the next annual meeting of security holders (or, in lieu of such an annual
meeting, a special meeting of security holders), with each of the securities
used for purposes of calculating that ownership having been held continu-
ously for at least two years as of the date of the nomination;
Intend to continue to own those securities through the date of that annual or
special meeting;
Be eligible, as to the security holder or each member of the security holder
group, to report beneficial ownership on Exchange Act Schedule 13G, rather
than Exchange Act Schedule 13D, in reliance on Exchange Act Rule 13d-
1(b) or (c); and
Have filed an Exchange Act Schedule 13G or an amendment to Exchange
Act Schedule 13G reporting their beneficial ownership as a passive or institu-
tional investor (or group) on such schedule before or on the date of the sub-
mission of the nomination to the company, which Schedule must include a
certification that the security holder or security holder group has held more
than 5% of the subject securities for at least two years.
Proposed Rule, supra note 66, at 60,788, 60,794.
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pressly contingent on the ability of shareholders to nominate candidates
under state law. Presumably, this limitation was included to avoid the
claim that the Commission had exceeded its authority and was engaged in
the regulation of corporate governance.70 State law, however, is remark-
ably silent on the election process. The Model Business Corporation Act,
for instance, simply provides that "directors are elected by a plurality of
the votes cast. .... "71 While there are provisions permitting proxy voting
and specifying what constitutes a valid proxy,72 the MBCA is silent on the
nomination process. Presumably, the drafters of the MBCA believed that
the election of directors would proceed as a typical organizational elec-
tion, with nominations taking place at the meeting. The provisions per-
mitting proxies are consistent with that view, because nominations
formally made at a shareholders' meeting of a publicly-held corporation
could not succeed without proxy voting. The SEC's awareness of this
approach under state law probably accounts for its assertion, expressed in
the release proposing the rule, that the rule applies "unless applicable
state law prohibits the company's security holders from nominating a can-
didate or candidates for election as a director." No state law prohibits
shareholders from nominating directors; therefore, the proposed rule
would apply in all states.
The proposed rule, however, dramatically changes the landscape of
U.S. corporate governance and arguably exceeds the SEC's authority
under §14(a) of the 1934 Act, upon which the SEC relied in proposing the
rule.73 The Business Roundtable decision, discussed briefly in Part II
above, limited the SEC's rulemaking authority under §14(a) to disclosure
rules.74 Similarly, dicta in a few Supreme Court decisions support that
view.75
While the SEC might argue that the proposed rule is disclosure ori-
ented, since shareholders already have the right to nominate directors,
shareholders in fact have no right under state law to include a nominee in
management's proxy statement.
The current practice of director elections in publicly-held corporations
has two important aspects: first, that persons currently serving as direc-
70. See supra, notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
71. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 7.28 (1979).
72. Id. § 7.22
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000). The Commission also stated, without analysis, that it
was relying on Sections 3(b), 10, 13-16, 23(a) and 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and corresponding provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 68 Fed. Reg. at
60,816.
74. See supra, notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
75. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1086 (1991) (Section 14(a)
authorizes the [SEC] to "adopt rules for the solicitation of proxies, and prohibits their
violation."); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (Section 14(a) and the rules
thereunder "prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate
action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."). See also
SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Section 14(a) serves to "ensure
that full and fair disclosure would be made to stockholders whose proxies are being solic-
ited so that an informed and meaningful consideration of the alternatives can be made.").
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tors, or a committee of them, will nominate persons who will serve the
best interests of the corporation; and second, that management of the
company will solicit proxies, at the company's expense, from the share-
holders to assure the election of those persons. Any shareholder who
wishes to elect other persons as directors is free to solicit proxies on their
behalf. Arguably, state law, by failing to affirmatively alter this scheme
(as, for instance, conditioning the ability of corporate management to use
corporate resources to solicit proxies), has incorporated this scheme into
law. The SEC's proposal, by contrast, alters both aspects of the status
quo. Not only is management's proxy statement now open to non-man-
agement nominees, but it is open to nominees who may be committed to
serving the best interests of the shareholder or shareholders who nomi-
nated them, like a labor union, and not the company as a whole.
The SEC's proposal, however, does present a stronger case for passing
judicial muster than did its proposed rule on disparate voting shares
struck down in Business Roundtable. That rule clearly impinged on ex-
isting state law, which permitted the issuance of such stock. By compari-
son, existing state law does not prohibit shareholder access to
management's proxy statement. Moreover, the rule bears a resemblance
to Rule 14(a)-8, a long-standing SEC rule that mandates shareholder ac-
cess to management's proxy statement to set forth proposals for share-
holder consideration that are proper under state law. 76 On the other
hand, the current SEC proposal goes beyond Rule 14(a)-8 because the
election of directors, and the manner in which they are elected, are so
central to corporate governance. Moreover, disclosure is only an inciden-
tal aspect of the rule; the heart of the rule is the requirement that corpo-
rate management solicit proxies to facilitate the election of shareholder
nominees.
Assuming the validity of the SEC's proposed rule, there is a real ques-
tion as to its advisability. As noted above, the rule opens the door to
"special interest" directors, who may feel accountable to the shareholder
group that elected them.77 Such directors may adversely affect the work-
ing environment and cohesiveness of the board, to the detriment of the
corporation. These issues, once thought to be concerns of state law, are
now questions of federal law, in turn raising the question as to whether
the SEC is better positioned to resolve them than state legislatures. Ar-
guably, the Commission is better positioned, inasmuch as it has consider-
able expertise in the regulation of publicly-held companies. Moreover,
state legislators have little incentive to tinker with the election process;
no obvious constituency is likely to raise the matter with the legislature.
The only well-organized lobby consists of corporate management, which
has successfully obtained anti-takeover legislation at the state level. It
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
77. For a discussion of this concern, see Detailed Comments of the Business Round-




remains to be seen whether that lobby will seek to undo the shareholder
access rule (assuming its adoption by the SEC) with amendments to the
state corporate law prohibiting shareholder nominations.
As a matter of policy, there is no reason to leave the matter of election
of directors exclusively to state law. In this regard, one might challenge
the notion, expressed above, that state law has somehow incorporated the
status quo as desirable. This is an argument of convenience, and lacks
any empirical support whatsoever. State law, though applicable to pub-
licly-held corporations, seems better designed for privately-held ones.
Despite increasing public concern with the corporate governance of pub-
licly-held corporations, state law has clearly moved in the direction of a
reduction in the number of mandatory provisions. The trend of state cor-
porate law has been in the direction of pure "enabling" statutes; that is,
statutes that allow the corporate actors freedom to shape the corporation
as they wish.78 This seems entirely appropriate when the relevant corpo-
rate actors-investors, promoters, lenders-are private parties negotiat-
ing with one another at arm's length. But this hardly describes the
modern publicly-held corporation, with a large divide between ownership
and control and no opportunity on the part of the owners to negotiate
with the managers. For these corporations, the trend has been in the op-
posite direction, led by the SEC and the stock exchanges, with the states
playing no role. One interpretation may be that the states have conceded
the irrelevance of state law in terms of the governance of publicly-held
corporations, 79 so federal rules on the proxy statement neither "conflict"
with any state law, nor encroach upon an area under scrutiny by state
legislators.
2. Enforcement Action
In recent enforcement actions, typified by In the Matter of Michael
Marchese,80 the SEC has also indicated a willingness to challenge the
traditional supremacy of state law. The respondent in this action was an
outside director of Chancellor Corporation, which was controlled and
dominated by Brian Adley, Chancellor's principal shareholder, board
chair and CEO. Adley defrauded Chancellor and caused it to file false
and misleading financial statements. Marchese was innocent of any ac-
tive wrongdoing, but was charged by the SEC with violations of reporting
rules and Rule 10b-5. He consented to cease and desist from future viola-
tions of these provisions.
What is noteworthy about the case is that the facts alleged against the
respondent presented a classic case of director breach of fiduciary duty,
not fraud. The SEC alleged that Marchese was reckless in failing to
78. See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 453, n.1 and accompanying text (1997).
79. The notable exception is state law in the area of takeover defenses. See infra,
notes 142-155 and accompanying text.
80. Exchange Act Release No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244 (Apr. 23, 2003).
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learning that transactions were not properly reported and that other mat-
ters related to the corporation's financial statements were not properly
recorded. There was no intimation that Marchese benefited personally
from the fraud, or was otherwise motivated to participate in it. He was a
director who simply trusted others to handle these matters. The standard
of director conduct has traditionally been a matter of state law, but this
action demonstrates how easily it can be transformed into an enforce-
ment action under the federal securities laws.81
The implications of Marchese are significant. Consider, for example,
the classic fiduciary duty case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.82 In that case, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of a company acquired
in a statutory merger were liable to their shareholders for breach of fidu-
ciary duty because they failed to adequately inform themselves before
agreeing to the merger and recommending that the shareholders approve
it.83 As a consequence, the proxy statement prepared by the company
was false and misleading. The SEC could take such a case and allege that
the directors violated Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the making of false or
misleading statements in a proxy solicitation.8 4 Traditionally, the SEC
has eschewed such action.
Van Gorkom is famous, of course, because it marked one of the few
times that a court found directors liable for breach of the duty of care. Of
equal importance, it motivated the Delaware legislature (at the prompt-
ing of the corporate law committee of the Delaware bar) to enact legisla-
tion that allowed Delaware corporations to exempt directors from
monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.85 The SEC is now
filling the void created by that legislation, and while Delaware directors
may be freed from liability for monetary damages to their shareholders
81. The Marchese case is not the first SEC action centering on the fiduciary duty of
directors. In Report of Investigation in the Matter of the Cooper Companies, Inc. as it
Relates to the Conduct of Cooper's Board of Directors, Release No. 34-35082, 58 S.E.C.
Docket 591, 1994 WL 707149 (S.E.C. Release) (Dec. 12, 1994) the SEC issued a report
under Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act on its investigation into the conduct of
the Board of The Cooper Companies when it confronted fraudulent conduct by certain of
its officers. The SEC was strongly critical of the Cooper board and stated: "The Commis-
sion has long viewed the issue of corporate governance and the fiduciary obligations of
members of management and the boards of directors of public companies to their investors
as an issue of paramount importance to the integrity and soundness of our capital mar-
kets." Id. at *6. The case was not, however, merely one of lack of due care. Rather, the
board, aware of fraudulent conduct, not only failed to take action to redress it, but issued a
false and misleading press release denying knowledge of the conduct. Moreover, unlike
Marchese, Cooper involved an allegation against the intentional conduct of the entire
board, not the negligent conduct of a single, disengaged director. See also Report of Inves-
tigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14380 (Jan.
16, 1978); Report Regarding the Investigation of Gould, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
13612 (June 9, 1977); Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homes, Exchange Act
Release No. 11516 (July 2, 1975); and Staff Report of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion on the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Company (August 3, 1972);
Microformed on CIS (Cong. Info. Serv.) No. H.
82. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
83. Id. at 893.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2003).
85. The applicable Delaware provision is:
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for breach of the duty of care, they face enforcement actions from the
SEC.
The Delaware legislation had a second effect-it motivated judges to
find a way around the exemption when the facts were sufficiently compel-
ling. The next section considers some recent cases demonstrating that
effect.
IV. THE REACTION IN THE COURTS
Judges are human and it is no wonder that the corporate scandals have
affected the way that judges decide cases. 86 In this Part, I consider just
three examples, two from Delaware (In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litigation8 7 and In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation88) and one
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (In re Abbott
Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation89). All three are share-
holder derivative claims. Disney and Abbott involve claims that directors
breached their duties of care, historically a notoriously difficult claim for
plaintiffs,90 while Oracle challenges the independence of a special litiga-
tion committee, also a problem for plaintiffs. 91
b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorpora-
tion may also contain any or all of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fidu-
ciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior
to the date when such provision becomes effective.
8 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (1991).
86. The author participated with a member of the Delaware Chancery Court in a 2003
symposium on corporate law. The judge freely conceded that the Chancery Court has
been affected by the news and the decisions noted in this Part may be evidence of that
effect.
87. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
88. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
89. 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
90. This was the case even before state statutes permitted corporations to exempt di-
rectors from monetary damages to shareholders for breach of the duty of care. See Joseph
W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Cor-
porate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078 (1968).
91. There are relatively few reported cases in which plaintiffs have successfully chal-
lenged the independence of a special litigation committee, and most of those seem to in-
volve single member committees. See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876,
888 (Minn. 2003) (one-person committee); Henderson v. Axiam, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 502, 502
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (unpublished table decision) (same); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962,
965 (Del. Ch. 1985) (same). C.f., McDonough v. Americom Int'l Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1016,
1021-22 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (two-person committee consisting of two of the three directors).
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A. IN RE DISNEY
The Disney case is part of a history of litigation 92 challenging the com-
pensation paid to Michael Ovitz, who served as Disney's CEO for one
year, yet received termination pay exceeding $140,000,000.93 The plain-
tiffs' basic allegation was that the board simply did not do its job in in-
forming itself about Ovitz's contract, a classic claim for breach of the duty
of care. However, the procedural posture of the case was whether de-
mand on the board would be excused as futile, and this would be the case
only if the plaintiffs could plead with particularity facts sufficient to rebut
the presumptions of the business judgment rule. 94 Plaintiffs' case was
complicated by the fact that under Disney's articles of incorporation, the
"directors would be protected from personal damages liability for any
breach of their duty of care."' 95 Thus, even a well-pleaded claim that the
directors breached their duty of care could not succeed. Nevertheless,
the court declined to dismiss the case.
The Chancery Court held in Disney that "[a] fair reading of the new
complaint.., gives rise to a reason to doubt whether the board's actions
were taken honestly and in good faith .... *"96 The court amplified this
assertion a bit later in the opinion: "the [alleged] facts belie any assertion
that the [Disney boards] exercised any business judgment or made any
good faith attempt to fulfill the fiduciary duties they owed to Disney and
its shareholders. '97 Thus, the case was recast from one of care to one of
good faith. The provision in Disney's articles of incorporation did not
(and under the statute could not) relieve the directors from liability for
monetary damages if they failed to act in good faith. Therefore, the court
concluded that the case could proceed to discovery notwithstanding the
lack of demand made by the plaintiffs.
The allegations in Disney are strikingly similar to those in Van
Gorkom, the paradigmatic due care case. In both cases, the board relied
heavily on the CEO to negotiate the transaction at issue, in Disney an
employment agreement and in Van Gorkom a sale of the company. In
both cases, the CEO had a personal friendship with the party with whom
he was negotiating on the opposite side of the transaction. Eisner (for
Disney) was a personal friend of Ovitz, 98 while Van Gorkom (the CEO of
Trans Union) was a personal friend of Pritzker, who was seeking to ac-
quire Trans Union. 99 In Van Gorkom, the board's detachment was char-
acterized as gross negligence, but the case has been understood to impose
92. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), affd in part,
rev'd in part, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), remanded to In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
93. In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 279.
94. Plaintiff could also avoid demand if the board had a conflict of interest. The facts
did not, however, support such an allegation. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-55.
95. In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 286.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 286-87.
98. Id. at 287.
99. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
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special obligations on a board when the question before it is the disposi-
tion of the company itself.100 In Disney, however, the board's detach-
ment was characterized as a good faith violation, and the issue before it
was not, of course, the disposition of the company. Moreover, much of
the decision in Disney seemed to turn on the personal relationship be-
tween Eisner and Ovitz, with the suggestion that Disney was unrepre-
sented in the negotiations and the board should have been more engaged
as a result.
Despite the similarities in the cases, and the fact that Van Gorkom is
the leading Delaware Supreme Court case on due care, the Chancery
Court did not even cite Van Gorkom in considering the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint. While the cases can be distinguished factually-per-
haps the directors were more disengaged in Disney-a comparison of the
cases still seems necessary. One might conclude from this that the Dela-
ware courts, at least the Chancery Court, are becoming more sensitive to
claims involving corporate excesses. The good faith doctrine, though
rarely explored in Delaware case law, 10 1 is now an area ripe for
development.102
B. IN RE ABBOTT
This theme, the rising importance of the doctrine of good faith, was the
critical factor in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Abbott as well. Abbott
arose out of penalties and losses the company suffered because one of its
manufacturing facilities did not meet FDA standards. Differences with
the FDA over the facility had been ongoing for several years and ulti-
mately resulted in a FDA order closing the facility. 103 The shutdown re-
sulted in lost sales, a $168 million charge to earnings, a $100 million fine,
the loss of a planned acquisition and a decline in Abbott's stock price. 10 4
These losses, the shareholders alleged, resulted from the board's failure
take action when the FDA raised its concerns. Like Disney, Abbott in-
volved a question as to whether shareholders must make a demand on
the board before proceeding with a derivative action. Like Disney, Ab-
100. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Director's Duty of Care in Negotiated Disposi-
tions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 579, 593-01 (1997).
101. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463 (2004)
("The good faith element has not been explored in much detail, either by the courts or
academics."). See, e.g., In re Rexene Corp. S'holders Litig., 1991 WL 77529, at *4 (Del. Ch.
May 8, 1991) ("Bad faith will be inferred where 'the decision is so beyond the bounds of
reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any [other] ground ... ')
(quoting from In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch 1988)). In neither
Rexene nor J.P. Stevens did the court uphold the claim that the directors acted in bad faith.
102. See Grogan v. O'Neil, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (D. Kan. 2003) (a recent case
applying Delaware law) ("The standards for [pleading] corporate waste and bad faith are
similar: to prevail on either claim, plaintiff must show that the board's decision was so
egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the
corporation's best interests.").
103. In re Abbott Labs., 325 F.3d at 800-01. Abbott and the FDA were in conflict over
manufacturing processes at Abbott's Diagonstics Division from 1993 to 1999. Id. at 799-
801.
104. Id. at 800-01.
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bott was essentially a due care case recast as a good faith case to permit
plaintiff to avoid the demand requirement.
Abbott, however, seemed to go beyond Disney in at least one signifi-
cant respect. Disney involved the approval of a material agreement that
was before the board for its approval. Abbott, by contrast, involved the
failure of the board to act. Assuming the truth of the allegations in the
complaint, the court characterized this failure to act as a "'sustained and
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight .... 11105 Inasmuch as
this failure was intentional and repeated over a long period of time, it
"indicate[s]" that "the directors' decision to not act was not made in good
faith and was contrary to the best interests of the company. ' 106
This analysis is flawed in at least two respects. First, it incorrectly
draws on a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court, In re Caremark,10 7
where the court announced that a board has a duty to assure that the
corporation has in place a system to assure the corporation's compliance
with applicable law. If the corporation violates the law, and it turns out
that no such law compliance program was in place, then the board might
be liable for a breach of its duty of care, provided the plaintiff can
demonstrate a sustained and systematic failure on the part of the board to
exercise oversight. In Abbott, the board was aware of the FDA's con-
cerns, but apparently made the business decision that management of the
company was properly attending to the dispute, the very sort of decision
that Caremark sought to immunize. More importantly, however, the de-
cision is entirely conclusory in finding that the behavior of the Abbott
board lacked good faith. The decision provides no guidance as to why the
board's conscious decision not to acquiesce in the FDA's demand was not
protected by the business judgment rule. Finally, the Delaware Supreme
Court has clearly stated that "a conscious decision to refrain from acting
may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the
protections of the rule. ' 108 The Abbott court should have addressed this
aspect of the business judgment rule.
One might conclude from Abbott, as from Disney, that the court was
skeptical of the combined effect of the business judgment rule and the
provision in the company's articles limiting the directors' liability. The
avenue for review was the good faith exception, which now seems inexo-
rably tied to due care; gross negligence, or reckless violations of the duty
of due care, indicate that the directors failed to act in good faith. If this
definition holds, then the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van
Gorkom has been resuscitated and the exemptive provisions in so many
articles of incorporation have been judicially amended.
105. Id. at 809 (quoting from In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
106. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
107. Id. at 972.
108. Aronson, supra note 47, at 813.
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C. IN RE ORACLE
Just as Disney and Abbott have re-defined due care and good faith, In
re Oracle re-defines independence. Oracle involved a challenge to a rec-
ommendation from a special litigation committee to dismiss a share-
holder's derivative claim. 10 9 The claim itself centered around alleged
insider trading by three officers of Oracle. The special litigation commit-
tee consisted of two directors, neither of whom was employed by the
company nor related by blood or marriage to any of the defendant direc-
tors. They were both members of the Stanford University faculty at the
time of the litigation and when the events in question occurred. Neither
of the members of the special litigation committee had any business deal-
ings with Oracle or with any entity affiliated with any of the defendants.
The two members joined the board after the events in question. They
thus satisfied traditional notions of independence, which tend to focus on
family and financial relationships. Nevertheless, the court found
otherwise.
In a thorough, well-reasoned, and persuasive opinion, Vice Chancellor
Strine considered the relationship between the defendant-directors and
Stanford University, concluding that given those relationships, which in-
cluded substantial past and possible future financial contributions by the
defendants, the special litigation committee might not be able to act im-
partially. 110 In eschewing the more traditional notions of independence,
the court turned to its "general sense of human nature.""' This analysis
takes into account the individual circumstances of the people in question
as well as structural bias, and is far more nuanced than a typical analysis
of independence. The opinion opens the door to a consideration of other
relationships, such as personal friendship, service on the same nonprofit
board, membership in the same religious organization, etc., that may af-
fect the ability of a person to judge another impartially.
Oracle, at its core, demonstrates the same sort of skepticism of board
behavior evident in Disney and Abbott.112 To provide relief to sharehold-
ers in the latter two cases, the court had to overcome a provision in the
companies' articles of incorporation that protected directors from liabil-
ity. In Oracle, the court had to reinterpret precedent on the issue of inde-
109. In re Oracle, 824 A.2d at 920-21.
110. Id. at 943-45.
111. Id. at 943.
112. See also Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 279 (Del. 2003). Krasner is another
recent Delaware case demonstrating skepticism of board independence. In this case, the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed the dismissal by the Court of Chancery of a class action
complaint challenging a board decision to approve a merger. Id. at 279. The board was
represented by a special committee and the Chancery Court found that the plaintiffs failed
to allege facts "sufficient to [impugn] the disinterest, independence or processes of the
special committee .. " Id. at 282. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the defendant directors, not the plaintiffs, bear the burden of proving that the committee
that approved the merger was disinterested and acted "independently, with real bargaining
power to negotiate the terms of the merger." Id. at 284-85. By shifting the burden to the




pendence. One irony of Oracle, in light of the recent stock exchange
rules,113 is that the Delaware court seems to be moving toward a more
flexible meaning of independence while the stock exchanges have opted
for a more precise definition based on financial relationships.
V. THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR AS SUPERHERO AND
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE AND THE MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL
A. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
In some sense, it is ironic, and maybe illogical, that Congress and the
stock exchanges have strengthened the hand of the independent director
and placed increasing confidence in the independent director to achieve
improved corporate governance. The irony is that in all of the high-pro-
file scandals, independent directors dominated the companies' boards.114
It is therefore illogical to assume that a greater role for independent di-
rectors would or might have avoided the identified problems. Moreover,
the clear trend in the last twenty years or so has been to increase both the
proportion of independent directors on boards and to increase their
role,115 yet the number and size of corporate scandals seem only to in-
crease. One might speculate that the independent directors are the cause
of the problem, not the solution.' 1 6
113. See supra, notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
114. E.g., the Enron board in 2001 consisted of fourteen directors, of which twelve were
independent, outside directors. Enron Definitive Proxy Statement, at http://www.enron.
com/corp/investors/sec/2001/2001-03-27-defl4a.pdf (Mar. 27, 2001). The boards of other
corporations recently embroiled in scandal offer similarly independent boards. Adelphia's
board in 2001 boasted five independent directors out of nine. Adelphia Definitive Proxy
Statement, at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/796486/000102140801503125/ddef
14a.txt (July 6, 2001). WorldCom in 2002 maintained a board of eleven: seven indepen-
dent, two retired corporate officers, and two current officers. WorldCom Definitive Proxy
Statement, at http://www.edgar-online.com/bin/irsec/finSys-main.asp?dcn=0000912057-02-
015985&x=120&y=24 (Apr. 22, 2002). Disney's most recent board in 2004 is composed of
eight independent directors out of eleven. Independent directors have long dominated the
boards of major companies. See, JOHN H. MATHESON & BRENT A. OLSON, 1 PUBLICLY
TRADED CORPORA'IONS: GOVERNANCE, OPERATION & REGULATION, § 2:26, text at n.12
(2003).
115. In 1990, for instance, the Business Roundtable, which consists of the CEOs of the
country's largest corporations, recommended that boards consist "predominantly" of inde-
pendent directors. Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competi-
tiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241, 249-50 (Nov. 1990). The American Bar Association reached
that conclusion many years before. American Bar Association, Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guide-
book, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625 (April 1978). These and other pronouncements had their
effect. In fact, the proportion of independent outside directors increased. Barry D. Bays-
inger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance
Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 114 (1985).
116. Of course, directors serve a role beyond guarding against management overreach-
ing; the board is also supposed to pay attention to the business of the company. On this
latter score, there is scant evidence that independent directors are better overseers of the
company's business and some empirical evidence that they are not. Sanjai Bhagat & Ber-
nard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Perform-
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Such speculation has no support among corporate observers, of course,
and much less among legislators and regulators. This lack of support is
understandable, and probably correct, because from a structural perspec-
tive independent directors are best situated to check overreaching by cor-
porate officers. If not independent directors, one might ask, who? The
only other candidates are governmental regulators, a solution that no one
embraces because of the fear that government has neither the resources
nor the expertise to monitor corporate governance. Moreover, regula-
tory solutions might stifle corporate competitiveness and economic
efficiency.117
Independent directors have failed the system not because they lack the
systemic authority to monitor corporate management, but rather because,
in many instances, they lack the will, the time and/or the incentives to do
so. American corporate governance is wedded to the notion of directors
who serve only part time and who have substantial, often overwhelming,
responsibilities outside of the corporation(s) on whose board(s) they
serve. Despite the legal responsibilities of serving as a director, a number
of boards of prominent companies feature former governmental officials
and various celebrities who add "luster" to the company on whose boards
they serve and who accept the positions for the prestige that comes with a
prominent directorship. 118 Such persons may, of course, be active, en-
gaged, competent and effective directors. There is, however, no reason to
assume that they are.
One solution, suggested by Professors Gilson and Kraakman, is to staff
boards with "professional" directors. 1 9 They propose that large institu-
tional investors cooperate with one another to create a cadre of indepen-
dent, professional directors. Such directors would then serve on a limited
number of boards-the authors propose six-but have no other signifi-
ance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (May, 1999) (evidence suggests that independent directors do not
improve corporate performance); Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Perform-
ance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. 31
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 377, 379 (1996) (same). Cf., Ira M. Millstein, The Profes-
sional Board, 50 Bus. LAW. 1427 (August, 1995) (arguing for independent directors);
Charles M. Elson, Enron and the Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor, 89 COR-
NELL L. REV. 496 (2004) (same). See generally Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors As a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 898 (1996) (summarizing studies); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 265, 286 (1997) (arguing that the structure of any given board should depend on
the needs of the particular firm).
117. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW, ch. 1 (1991).
118. For example, MGM Inc. lists filmmaker Francis Ford Coppola and actress Priscilla
Presley among its list of directors. 2002 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Annual Report, at http://
www.mgm.com/corporate/shareholder-reports/2002/MGM_2002_AnnualReport.pdf.
Coca-Cola's board includes former Senator Sam Nunn. Coca Cola Board of Directors, at
http://www2.coca-cola.com/ourcompany/board.html. And former Georgetown University
and United States Olympic basketball coach John R. Thompson, Jr., sits on the board of
directors at Nike. Corporate Governance, at http://www.nike.comnikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?
page=7&item=board&ex=johnr.
119. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 884 (1991).
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cant employment. Their compensation from each directorship would be
significantly greater than current director compensation, and the aggre-
gate compensation from six or so boards would be enough to attract
highly qualified individuals to the cadre. These professional directors
would be more effective as monitors, presumably, because they would
have "a focused mandate and the time to familiarize themselves with
their companies. '120
The notion of a professional cadre of outside directors, who have both
the skills and the resources to serve as directors, is an attractive idea. It is
not, however, an idea that has moved beyond the theoretical stage in the
thirteen years since it was first promulgated. It may be that it is too diffi-
cult for institutional investors to coalesce around such an idea, or that
such investors do not believe that the idea is feasible or preferable to the
status quo. Whatever the reasons, however, institutions have not moved
in the direction that Professors Gilson and Kraakman have suggested, nor
are they likely to do so.
B. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Instead of dramatic new models for corporate governance, regulators
and courts have preferred to tinker with the current model, and investors
have taken few initiatives of their own. Arguably, the latest reforms, dis-
cussed above, will not prove equal to the task. Despite the increased re-
sponsibilities and power of independent directors, their incentives to
monitor and challenge management compensation and self-dealing have
not changed. At the core of the problem is the business judgment rule,
which limits the potential liability of a director for breaches of the duty of
care.121 A director is only liable if he or she is grossly negligent,122 and
the rule presumes that the director acted with due care.123 Thus, a share-
holder challenging director conduct bears the burden of proving that the
director acted with gross negligence. If the company has an exculpatory
provision in its articles of incorporation, as nearly all publicly-held corpo-
rations do, the plaintiff-shareholder must prove that the director failed to
120. Id. at 885.
121. The Delaware Supreme Court has characterized the rule as:
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpo-
ration acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company .... Absent an
abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The bur-
den is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). See generally J. Rob-
ert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Compa-
nies, 38 U. RiCH. L. REV. 317, 339-41 (2004) (giving an overview of the duty of care).
122. Aronson 473 A.2d at 812. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) ("We again confirm that view [expressed in Aronson]. We think the concept of gross
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment
reached by a board of directors was an informed one.").
123. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916-17 (Del. 2000)
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act in good faith or intentionally harmed the corporation.' 24 As if these
legal standards were not enough to reduce a director's incentives to act
with care, directors invariably have indemnification rights12 5 and insur-
ance, and courts have limited the ability of shareholders to obtain discov-
ery in derivative actions alleging director misconduct.' 2 6 While in some
recent cases the courts have been scaling back on these procedural pro-
tections,12 7 the business judgment rule remains a formidable protection
for outside directors. Is this as it should be?
The core philosophy of the business judgment rule, developed through-
out the twentieth century, is widely accepted, and indeed, widely em-
braced.128 Without the rule, it is said, qualified persons would not serve
as directors and people who did serve would be highly risk averse, to the
detriment of shareholders. Scholars argue that shareholders are diversi-
fied and, therefore, have different risk preferences than managers.1
2 9
Moreover, the market for corporate control acts as a check against in-
competent corporate management; litigation and/or regulation are unnec-
124. See supra, note 121. See also, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984) (adopted
comprehensively in Iowa, Maine and Mississippi. IowA CODE ANN. § 490.831 (West 2002);
13-C Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 832 (West 2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.31 (1999)). Forty-
three states authorize article provisions that limit or eliminate civil liability for directors in
most situations. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP ACT ANN. 8-211 to 8-212 (Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, 3d ed. 2002).
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145 (2002) (providing for permissible and mandatory
indemnification rights for directors); see also Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 693 (3d
Cir. 1994) (upholding mandatory indemnification rights to directors of Delaware corpora-
tions); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344 (Del. 1983) (allowing corpora-
tions to "grant indemnification rights beyond those provided by the statute").
126. E.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208-10 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (requiring shareholder's derivative suit to be
subject to dismissal on the basis of a well-pleaded complaint and not allowing discovery);
Resnick v. Karmax Camp Corp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (1985) (noting that courts impose
more strict requirements on discovery when dealing with shareholder derivative suits due
to their harassment potential); cf. In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 312 (2002)
(allowing shareholders limited discovery into director decision-making in a derivative suit
where demand was refused).
127. See supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
128. E.g., DENNIS J. BLOCK, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3 (3d ed. 1989) (noting that the business judgment rule has been
in effect for over a century and a half and is adjusted to fit new situations); Theodore S.
Farfaglia, The Business Judgment Rule: A Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability in PRO-
TECTING CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS AGAINST LIABILITY 241 (Research and
Documentation Corporation ed., 1971) (discussing the pervasiveness-and therefore lack
of discussion-of the business judgment rule); R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1341-43 (August, 1993) (discuss-
ing the benefits of deferring to directors in making business judgments and noting the
historical lineage of the rule).
129. Easterbook & Fischel, supra note 117 at 99-100 ("Managers especially want to
avoid risk because they cannot diversify the value of their human capital. Shareholders,
however, readily diversify risk through capital markets. They want managers to take the
projects with the highest mean returns, which may entail high risk"). But see William K.S.
Wang, Selective Disclosure by Issuers, Its Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some Observations
in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 880 & n. 65 (2002) (arguing that
shareholders are not diversified).
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essary and inefficient. 130 Finally, the rule is justified on the basis that
judges are ill-equipped to make business decisions; therefore, they should
not be in the position of substituting their decisions for those of the
directors. 31
The foregoing conventional wisdom about the business judgment rule
is only partially true, and, in any case, misses the point. The business
judgment rule addresses process, not investment philosophy. Directors
can, and probably should, be risk preferring and so long as they act with
care, they should not be liable if their judgment proves to be mistaken.
The market for corporate control, in theory, can act as a check against
incompetent boards, but that market is hardly free and vigorous. 132 In
fact, state law that provides corporate management with a wide array of
defenses to a hostile takeover has radically changed the market for corpo-
rate control in the last twenty years.133 Today, it hardly exists. Moreover,
the market does not work for individual directors; there is no evidence
that persons who serve on the boards of failed corporations suffer reputa-
tional harm from their service.
The most prominent argument in favor of the business judgment rule-
that qualified persons will not serve without the rule-is similarly flawed.
The decision of whether to serve on a corporate board is influenced not
only by the potential liability, or costs, of service, but also by potential
rewards. Corporations have been successful at attracting prestigious indi-
viduals to serve as directors, at relatively nominal fees, because the costs
of being a director are low and are outweighed by the rewards. The costs,
which are primarily time commitments and potential liability, have been
held down by the business judgment rule. On the other hand, the re-
wards, which consist primarily of the prestige of serving on a corporate
board and the compensation that accompanies it, have been increasing.
If the protections of the business judgment rule were scaled back, or the
availability of exculpatory provisions were eliminated, the costs of serving
as a director would surely increase. But this only means that the rewards
would have to increase commensurately to assure the availability of di-
rectors. It would mean that persons serving as directors would have to
devote more time to their work (and thus, by necessity, serve on fewer or
no other boards) and would expect more compensation. In short, a
130. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965), Symposium, The Legacy of Henry G. Manne-Pioneer in Law & Eco-
nomics and Innovator in Legal Education-Panel I: The Market for Corporate Control, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999).
131. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (cautioning that a rule which would "expose direc-
tors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries.., would, in the long-
run, be injurious to investor interests").
132. Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor
Cary's Polemic, 71 U. CoLo. L. REV. 497, 530-31 (2000).
133. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381,
384-85 (2002) (cautioning that the poison pill, as the ultimate defense in a hostile takeover,
prevents meritorious hostile takeovers and can harm shareholders).
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change in the legal rules governing director conduct could have the effect
of professionalizing the boardroom.
Proposing a significant change to the business judgment rule is indeed a
radical idea and one not easily implemented. The standard for director
conduct, despite Sarbanes-Oxley, remains a question of state law, which
could change either by legislative action or judicial decision. As noted
above, the Disney and Abbott cases suggest that judicial attitudes are
changing.' 34 The changes appear, however, to be marginal. Significant
change could come through legislative action, but state legislators may
not have sufficient incentive to change the law. On the one hand, state
legislators may believe that their constituents would be best served by
more stringent standards on directors. Whether such beliefs would pro-
vide sufficient motivation to change the law depends, in part, on whether
states compete with one another for attracting and retaining incorpora-
tions. Arguably, states that impose higher standards on directors would
fail to attract new incorporations and would lose incorporations as com-
panies re-incorporate in other, more permissive jurisdictions. This, in
,turn, arguably would have an economic consequence, as the states losing
incorporations would also lose the corresponding franchise fees and, pos-
sibly, the physical presence of the corporation as well.
This dynamic of promoters and corporate managers seeking a
favorable jurisdiction in which to incorporate or re-incorporate suggests a
competition among the states. In 1974, writing for the Yale Law Journal,
Professor William Cary lamented the fact that state law did not ade-
quately protect the interests of shareholders. 135 He attributed this to a
competition among the states to attract incorporations. 136 To win in this
competition, he argued, states would design their laws to appeal to corpo-
rate managers, and shareholders would (and had) suffered as a result. He
characterized this competition as a "race to the bottom. '137 To rectify
this state of affairs, he suggested a federal corporate code. 138
Professor Cary's thesis has been vigorously contested, with other com-
mentators arguing that if a state's corporate law disadvantaged investors,
they would discount the shares of companies incorporated there, raising
134. See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
135. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
136. This idea predates Cary. Justice Brandeis, writing in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,
288 U.S. 517, 557-60 (1933) expressed the same skepticism:
Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters had
removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws .... The race was one
not of diligence but of laxity .... [T]he great industrial States yielded in order
not to lose wholly the prospect of the revenue and, the control incident to
domestic incorporation.
137. Cary, supra note 135, at 705.
138. For an overview of this debate see Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation
Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1041-56 (1986).
Others have advocated for a federal corporate code as well. See, e.g., NADER, GREEN &
SELIGMAN, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the company's cost of capital.139 Companies facing a higher cost of capi-
tal than their competitors would suffer in the markets in which they com-
pete; thus, promoters and managers would seek state corporate codes
that result in a lower cost of capital. This phenomenon would lead states
to compete for the most economically efficient corporate law, that is, a
race to the "top. '140
While the "race" debate has spawned an impressive and growing litera-
ture, 141 it seems sufficient to say that only in a few states, primarily Dela-
ware, are corporate franchise fees a material part of state revenues, 142
and there is no evidence that corporate promoters or managers choose
their state of operations based on where the company is incorporated. In
other words, with a few exceptions, states do not craft their corporate
laws to attract, or avoid losing, corporate franchise fees, and it is unlikely
that states fear the loss of jobs or tax revenue (other than franchise fees)
if businesses choose to organize under the laws of another jurisdiction.
This does not, however, mean that state statutes are drafted or
amended without regard to the law of other states. To the contrary, inno-
vative corporate law provisions, which generally originate in Delaware,
are frequently copied across the country. 143 It is unjustified, however, to
139. This view was most prominently stated in Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
140. Id. at 289-92.
141. A recent contribution is that of Mark J. Roe, supra note 7 (arguing that Delaware
is limited in its lawmaking discretion by its perception of how the federal government
might respond to its actions). For further scholarly debate on the race question, see Robert
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 533 (2001) (find-
ing that incorporating in Delaware can enhance share values by as much as five percent);
Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evi-
dence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795
(2002) (supporting the notion of a race to the bottom); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) (concluding that
Delaware has won the race, precluding further competition); Mark J. Loewenstein, Dela-
ware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, 71 U. CoLo. L. REV.
497, 501 (2000) (arguing that states do not compete).
142. See Loewenstein, supra note 132, at 506-07 ("the vast majority of states charged
[incorporation fees of] $100 or less, with some charging as little as $10"). Nevada is re-
puted to be a state anxious to attract additional incorporations. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 394 (2003) ("Other
than Delaware, which is a huge "importer" [of re-incorporations], only Nevada has a sig-
nificant net inflow of firms."); Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and
Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 681, 731 (2003) ("A few individual states have also remained or emerged as
competitors with Delaware, with some limited success. Nevada has attempted to become
the Delaware of the West. In some ways it offers laws that are even more pro-management
than those of Delaware.")
143. For example, Delaware amended its preemptive rights statute in 1967, effectively
creating an "opt in" statute that denies preemptive rights unless affirmatively granted in
the articles of incorporation. ERNEST L. FOLK, III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORA-
TION LAW 11 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (1986). Today, thirty-two other
jurisdictions have joined Delaware in adopting "opt-in" statutes. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. 6-176 (Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association, 3d ed. 2002). Similarly, most states and the MBCA have followed
Delaware's lead in limiting civil liability for directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1986); supra note 124.
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conclude that this is so because states must "meet the competition," be-
cause at the same time one can find a good deal of variation from state to
state in corporate law.144 This variation is utterly inconsistent with the
thesis that states are competing for incorporations. Rather, the widely-
adopted provisions, the commonality between and among statutes (and
there is a good deal of that as well), are explainable by other factors,
including legislators' good faith perceptions of sound public policy. 145
If states are not constrained by competition, why have they not, in the
face of mounting corporate scandals, repealed provisions that allow cor-
porations to exempt directors from the duty of care? Similarly, why have
they not amended the business judgment rule? One can only theorize the
answer to these questions, and I can offer a few ideas. First, legislators
may not perceive a relationship between their corporate codes and corpo-
rate behavior. Nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 companies are in-
corporated in Delaware, 146 so to the extent a legislator considers
corporate scandals as a function of state law, he would (unless a Dela-
ware legislator) place the blame elsewhere. Second, legislators may con-
sider this a "federal" problem, one to be solved by Congress or the stock
exchanges. Indeed, both responded swiftly and dramatically to the cur-
rent wave of corporate scandals, as they (especially Congress and the
SEC) have since the stock market crash of 1929.147
144. See Loewenstein, supra note 132, at 524-29.
145. Id. at 536-39.
146. See Delaware Division of Corporations (last modified February 14, 2004), at http://
www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml.
147. The stock market crash resulted in the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933, Pub.
L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2000)) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)). The former sought to regulate the public issuance of se-
curities, while the latter, generally speaking, regulates trading in securities. See generally,
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION, 6, 12-18 (3d ed. 1998).
In response to serious proxy fights in the 1950s, the SEC adopted a number of new rules
regulating proxy solicitations. See John Pound, Proxy voting and the SEC: Investor Protec-
tion Versus Market Efficiency, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1991).
Following public outcry in the aftermath of the "going private" phenomenon, the SEC
adopted rule 13e-3, "Going Private Transactions by Certain Issuers," 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3
(2003). See A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 278, at D-3 (Nov. 20, 1974).
In response to perceived abuses in the tender offer area, Congress passed the Williams Act
in 1968, adding to, or amending, several sections of the 1934 Act. (The Williams Act is the
popular name for Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), which amended §§ 12, 13, 14(a),
14(c), and 16 and added §§ 14(c), 14(d), and 14(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Williams Act takes its name from Sen. Harrison Williams of New Jersey, one of its
prime sponsors and most vocal advocates. Congress subsequently amended §§ 13(d), 13(e),
14(d), and 14(e) of the Exchange Act in 1970 when it adopted Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat.
1497 (1970).) The SEC subsequently adopted numerous rules to implement the policies of
the Williams Act. See Harvey Leiser, The SEC: A Black Knight for Target Management-
An Analysis of Some Recent SEC Rules and Proposed Rules, 7 J. CORP. L. 21, 36 (1981).
To increase shareholder voice, the SEC amended several of its rules, and adopted new
rules, in 1992. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276,
48,287 (Oct. 22, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); see Requirements as to Proxy,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1). See Thomas W. Briggs, Shareholder Activism and In-
surgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 Bus. LAW. 99 (1994).
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Third, the most prominent culprits in this wave of scandals are execu-
tive officers, not the independent, outside directors. As these officers are
being prosecuted by criminal laws long on the books, a legislator might
view the problem as one already adequately addressed by law. It is
human nature to seek a limited solution to a problem, if one seems to be
available, and rethinking the construct of corporate governance is more
complicated than focusing on the visible wrongdoers. Thus, it is reasona-
ble for an observer to conclude that the frauds resulted from the avarice
of corporate officers, and if the laws that prohibit such conduct need to
be tightened, then that is the answer. By contrast, to approach the prob-
lem from the perspective of corporate governance is complicated and
subtle. The solutions it might yield are less direct, and therefore might be
perceived by the public as inadequate. 148
Finally, corporate governance is not a priority in state legislative halls.
Revisions to statutes dealing with business organizations typically origi-
nate with bar association committees. The Model Business Corporation
Act, for instance, is a project of a committee of the American Bar Associ-
ation. 149 Once approved by that committee, the act, or revisions of it, are
reviewed by state bar committees who then may propose a bill to their
state legislatures. It is unlikely that corporate lawyers would take the
initiative to reverse the business judgment rule or the exculpatory provi-
sions on director liability. While lawyers on law revision committees try
to "do the right thing," they typically represent corporate officers and
directors. It is difficult to recommend a law that would increase the lia-
bility of their clients. Moreover, these lawyers may not be convinced (or
even be amenable to being convinced) that a higher legal standard of care
for directors would have avoided the problem. The conventional wisdom
on the business judgment rule-its role in attracting competent directors
and encouraging them to take risks-is so deeply embedded in the psyche
of most corporate lawyers that it is not reasonable to expect them to be
the engines of change.
A change in standards of director conduct is therefore unlikely to come
from state legislatures. Surely Delaware has no incentive to change its
law and jeopardize its lucrative incorporation business. While some legis-
lators elsewhere around the country may identify the business judgment
rule and the exculpatory provision as potentially part of the problem,
they, too, are unlikely to act. This explains, of course, why Congress and
the stock exchanges acted with such gusto in the aftermath of Enron.
Though often derided, Professor Cary's advocacy of a federal corporate
The foregoing is not an exhaustive review of federal response to problems in the area of
corporate governance, but does give the reader a sense of the response of the federal gov-
ernment. By comparison, state response has been quite muted.
148. It is interesting to note that the stock exchanges focused more heavily on corpo-
rate governance than did Congress in Sarbanes-Oxley. This may be because the listing
requirements might strike member of Congress as overly detailed for a federal statute.
149. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association.
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code is becoming a de facto reality with the combination of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the stock exchange rules. While neither Congress nor the
stock exchanges have tinkered with the business judgment rule, that may
come with another round of scandals, completing the transformation in
corporate law.
C. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
The business judgment rule is not the only state law concept that has
stymied meaningful reform in corporate governance. Among the other
candidates are state laws150 or judicial decisions that inhibit the market
for corporate control. 151 If the market for corporate control were more
robust, incentives for active monitoring would increase. 152 Potential ac-
quirers of corporate assets would form another highly incentivized group
of corporate monitors.153
The takeover wave of the 1980s, however, led corporate management
to seek protective legislation from their state legislatures, and in many
instances, the legislatures complied. 154 Of equal importance, many cor-
porations enacted self-help protections, in the form of poison pills and
other devices, to discourage hostile takeover attempts. The courts gener-
ally upheld these devices, providing management with considerable free-
dom to ward off such attempts.155
These laws and judicial decisions have hurt shareholders, yet, as in the
case of the business judgment rule, relief from state legislatures seems
unlikely. Shareholders have not yet become effective lobbyists at the
state level, while corporate management has been for a long time. State
150. E.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-17-1, et. seq. (1989) (Indiana share control law, discussed
and upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (Delaware's moratorium statute, discussed and upheld in BNS, Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); 15 PENN. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 515, 1715,
2561-68, 2581-83 (West 1995) (multifaceted anti-takeover law).
151. E.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1989) (target not required to allow shareholders to choose between management's choice
of merger partner and considerably higher hostile bid); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (approving the poison pill); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (approving a discriminatory self-tender by the target). See Jef-
frey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1944-45
(1991) (noting the effect of the Time case as increasing management's freedom of action).
152. See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113
YALE L.J. 621 (2003) (concluding that reviving the hostile takeover marketplace will im-
prove corporate governance and suggests re-evaluating the costs of takeover defenses);
John C. Anjier, Anti-Takeover Statutes, Shareholders and Risic, 51 LA. L. REV. 561 (1991)
(noting that the rate of mergers and acquisitions was at an all time high in the 1980's, to the
benefit of shareholders, after which most states adopted anti-takeover statutes without
public debate and which protect corporate management while increasing divergence of
interests between managers and shareholders).
153. See generally Symposium, The Legacy of Henry G. Manne-Pioneer in Law &
Economics and Innovator in Legal Education-Panel I: The Market for Corporate Control,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999).
154. E.g., the Indiana share control law, supra note 150, was passed by the Indiana
legislature at the behest of CTS Corp., which immediately invoked the provisions of the
Act.
155. See supra note 152.
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legislators respond to a CEO who might threaten to move corporate of-
fices outside of the state, but not to a shareholder who threatens to dump
her shares. In short, the promise of a change of control as a prescription
for sick management is more a myth than a reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
Enron and other corporate scandals that emerged at the turn of the
millennium generated strong reaction from several different potential
regulators: Congress, the SEC, the stock exchanges and the courts. Ironi-
cally, and somewhat unfortunately, one key player in the development of
corporate law, the state legislature, was remarkably absent in enacting
reforms. The states seem to have abdicated their traditional role of defin-
ing the internal affairs of corporations, at least insofar as publicly-held
corporations are concerned.
Despite these many initiatives, however, the underlying problem of
corporate governance remains unsolved. In the high-profile cases, corpo-
rate officers were able to mulct their corporations because their boards
failed to adequately monitor either the behavior of the officers or the
affairs of the corporation. The reason for this failure is well known-
independent directors lack the incentives and resources to discharge their
duties. Yet many of the reforms noted above merely seek to increase the
number and clout of the independent directors without altering their in-
centives or resources.
State law can address this fundamental problem, but, with some excep-
tions in the judicial realm, has actually moved in the opposite direction
the past twenty years. State law could increase the incentives to monitor
by requiring a higher standard of care for directors and by removing the
barriers to a change of control. Doing so would incentivize independent
directors to be more professional as directors, and they would, in turn,
demand the resources (and compensation) to discharge their heightened
duties. Potential legal liability and the market for control are powerful
incentives to behavior, yet state law has disabled both.
The next wave of corporate scandals may well result in a further trans-
formation of state control over the internal affairs of our corporations.
The calls for federal corporate codes will, at that time, be difficult to re-
sist. Yet, it is unlikely that states will act before then. Outside of Dela-
ware, there is little economic incentive for them to do so. Whether
Delaware, which has powerful incentives to act, will take the initiative
remains to be seen. While the Delaware courts seem to be reacting, the
legislature has thus far remained silent. 156 In light of the current Dela-
ware corporate code, the influence of the courts is somewhat limited. At
the same time, however, it seems unlikely that the Delaware bar will rec-
ommend to its legislature that it radically alter the standard of conduct
156. See Sale, supra note 101, at 457 (commenting on the silence of the Delaware
legislature).
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for directors or open the market for control of Delaware corporations.
Thus, the days of Delaware's and, indeed, other states' influence in mat-
ters of corporate law may be numbered.
